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The Public Interest Standard in the Communications Act and the Hearing Impaired:
Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried' — The Communications Act of
1934 2 was enacted to assure rapid, efficient radio service for all the people of the United
States.' The statute established the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or the
"Commission") to enforce and execute its purposes. 4 Pursuant to the provisions of the
Communications Act, the Commission may approve an application for the renewal of a
broadcasting license whenever it determines that the "public interest, convenience and
necessity would be served thereby. ” 5 The renewal may he granted without a hearing if the
application meets certain FCC requirements."
Under the Communications Act, when a broadcaster seeks a license renewal, any
party in interest may petition the FCC to deny the license application.' Parties in interest
include responsible representatives of the listening public, as well as persons who can
show economic injury and electrical interference.' If the allegations in the petition raise
substantial and material questions of fact, the Commission will designate the license
application for a hearing on the specific issues presented." On the other hand, if the
Commission Finds that the petition does not present substantial questions of fact and that.
a grant of an application would not he prima facie inconsistent with the public interest, it
will deny the petition and grant the license renewal.'" Congress has delegated broad
discretionary authority to the Commission to determine the components of the public
interest standard against which it measures a licensee's application, requiring only that the
test be based on the purposes of the Communications Act." Recognizing this broad
discretion, the courts have consistently upheld the FCC's determinations under this
standard.' 2
When confronted with federal legislation other than the Communications Act that
may have an impact on the public interest standard, the FCC decides whether or not to
' 459 U.S. 498 (1983).
2 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
3 Id.
Id.
5 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976). Although the origin of the phrase "public convenience, interest and
necessity" is unclear, a former FCC chairman stated that the phrase was suggested to Senate drafters
of the Communications Act who were struggling to define a regulatory standard by a young lawyer
on loan from the Interstate Commerce Commission. M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS
MEDIA LAW, 650-51 (2d ed. 1982)(hereinafter cited as FRANKLIN], Other federal statutes, such as the
Transportation Act, used that guideline. Id., citing H. FRIENDLY, THE: FE:DE:RAI. ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES 54-55 (1962). The standard, however, loses meaning under the Communications Act,
where the issue is seldom whether there is a need for broadcasting service but rather who shall supply
it, Id.
6 47 C.F.R. § 73.3591 (1982). The application must not present any material or substantial
question of fact and must meet the following requirements: (1) that another mutually exclusive
application is not pending; (2) that the applicant is legally, technically, financially and otherwise
qualified; (3),that the applicant is not in violation of provisions of law, the FCC rules, or established
policies of the FCC; and (4) that a grapt of the application would otherwise serve the public interest,
convenience and necessity. Id.
7 47 U.S.G. § 309(d)(1) (1976).
In Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), the court found that the listening public is a party in interest and has standing to contest a
renewal application.
9 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1976).
" 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(2) (1976).
" See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
" See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
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incorporate the policies expressed in that legislation. 13
 One example of a statute which has
a potential effect on the FCC's duties under the Communications Act is the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973) 4
 The Rehabilitation Act 15 was passed to insure the civil rights of the
handicapped."' Legislative history of the act reveals that Congress intended to integrate
the handicapped into normal living, working and service patterns) 7 To help effect this
policy, section 509 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits recipients of federal financial
assistance from discriminating against otherwise qualified handicapped persons.'s The
United States Supreme Court considered the question of the interaction of the policies
underlying the Communications Act and the Rehabilitation Act in Community Television of
Southern California V. Gottfried . 19
The controversy in Community Television arose in 1977 when Sue Gottfried, a hearing
impaired individual, petitioned the FCC to deny the license renewal applications of eight
Los Angeles television stations for violating section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and for
failing to ascertain the needs of the deaf and hearing impaired in their service area."
Seven of the stations seeking renewal were commercial stations. 2 ' The other was a
noncommercial or public station. 22
 In addition to the general allegations raised against all
the stations, Ms. Gottfried specifically charged that the public station had refused to air a
captioned version of ABC News prior to May of 1977, even though the service was
available through the Public Broadcasting Service. 23
 When the station finally began to air
the program, the petition stated, the program was still not broadcast during prime time."
The FCC denied Gottfried's petition, finding that the beets alleged failed to raise any
substantial or material question as to whether granting the license renewals would serve
the public interest. 23
 Licensees, the Commission stated, were not required to provide
" See infra notes 82 - 87 and accompanying text.
" See Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983).
" 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
16
'T Note, Death Knell for Trageser: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in Light of North Haven, 85 W.
VA. L. REV. 371, 585 (1983).
18
 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 * 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). Section 504 provides: "No otherwise
qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, he
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of', or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." id.
' 9 459 U.S. 498 (1983).
2" License Renewal Applications, 69 F.C.C.2d 451, 451-52 (1978). The petitions were filed by
Gottfried, individually and on behalf of the deaf and hearing impaired in the Los Angeles area./d. at
451. Petitioners sought denial of license renewals to eight stations. Id.
21 The seven commercial stations arc KABC -TV, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.;
KCOP-TV, KCOP Television, Inc.; KHO-TV, RKO General, Inc.; KN BC-TV, National Broadcast-
ing Co., Inc.; KN XT-TV, CBS, Inc.; KTI,A -TV, Golden West Broadcasters; and KT-Tv-Tv, Met-
romedia, Inc. Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297, 300 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
" Id. The noncommercial station was KCET-TV, Community Television of Southern Califor-
nia.
21
 License Renewal Applications, 69 F.C.C.2d at 458 n.9 (1978).
" Id.
" Id. at 459. Ms. Gottfried's petition alleged that the licensees' efforts to ascertain ihe commu-
nity's needs and interests were defective particularly in respect to the hearing impaired in the
community, and that the stations violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because their past pro-
gramming did not meet the needs ofthe deaf. Id. at 452. In response, the Commission found that its
regulations on ascertainment do not require that stations specifically seek out representatives of the
deaf when conducting their survey of community needs. Id. at 956. According to the Commission,
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either closed or open captioning, although the FCC encouraged stations to experiment
with ways to meet the needs of the hearing impaired and required television licensees to
broadcast emergency information visually. 26 According to the. Commission, stations are
not specifically required to ascertain and provide for the needs of the deaf. 27 The
Commission recognized that the single noncommercial station involved in the controversy
might fall within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act, but stated that the FCC was not
the proper agency to determine whether a violation of section 504 of that statute had
occurred."
After Gottfried brought a petition to reconsider, the FCC reaffirmed its prior
decision. 29 The Commission again discussed Gott fried's claim that section 504 of t he
Rehabilitation Act required denial of the license renewal applications. Noting that the
provision applies only to licensees receiving federal financial assistance, the Commission
concluded that section 504 does not apply to commercial slat in ns. 3" Concerning the public
station, the Commission stated that absent an adverse finding by the proper agency
against the station, any action on its part would be premature."' The FCC also found that
it was not required to adopt regulations to implement section 504 because the FCC does
not extend federal financial assistance to its licensees.' The Commission noted that only
agencies empowered to extend financial assistance were required to promulgate such
rules." In addition, the Commission found no error in its earlier determination that the
licensees were serving the public interest. 34 Because no requirement to provide captioning
however, the licensees did include leaders from groups aware of the problems of the hearing
impaired in their surveys. Id. at 456 - 67. Concerning programming, the Commission found evidence
of programs about the deaf, but few for the deaf. Id. at 457. The Commission did, however, list
programs offered by the licensees with visual components making them accessible to the hearing
impaired. Id. at 457-58, n.8,9. Because the Commission had no requirement that stations use
specialized techniques such as captioning or sign language that render the programs accessible to the
deaf, however, the Commission concluded that it would not find a licensee at fault for not providing
such programs. Id. at 458. Addressing the issue of violation of the Rehabilitation Act, the Commis-
sion noted that until the agency designated to consider such matters reviewed an alleged violation,
the Commission had no reason to consider such allegations. Id. at 459.
26 Id. at 454-55. "Open" captioning involves the transmission to all viewers of a printed display
of text at the bottom of the television screen. Id. at 454. "Closed - captioning requires the use of an
encoder at the transmitting end and a decoder at the receiving encl. Id. With closed captioning, the
visual display of text can be seen only by persons owning television sets equipped with a decoder, Id.
" Id. at 455, (citing Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants (Renewal
Primer), 57 F.C,C.2d 418(1976); Ascertainment of Community Problems by Noncommercial Broad-
cast Applicants, Permittees, and Licensees (Noncommercial Primer), 58 F.C.C.2c1 526 (1976)).
" License Renewal Applications, 69 F.C.C.2d at 459. The FCC stated that the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, ("HEW"), was the proper governmental agency to determine
whether a public television station violated the Rehabilitation Act. a The FCC noted that it would
take any adverse findings into consideration. Id.
2" License Renewal Applications (Petition for Reconsideration), 72 F.C.C.2d 273, 281 (1979).
On reconsideration, Gottfried argued that the Commission should deny the renewal applications
because of the licensees' failure to observe the national policy of nondiscrimination against the
handicapped. Id. at 274. Further, the petitioner alleged that the FCC abrogated its duty to issue
regulations enlnrcing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to HEW regulat ions. Id. 276.
"" Id. at 276.
31 Id. at 278.
Id.
" Id. at 278.
34 Id. at 279.
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existed during the term of the previous license, the FCC decided that. it would he unfair to
judge a licensee's renewal application adversely based on the station's failure to provide
such programming. 35 Gottfried then appealed the Commission's decision to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals pursuant to section 402 of the Communications Act. as
The Court of Appeals vacated the portion of the Commission's order that rejected
the application to deny renewal of the public station's license, but upheld the portion
concerning the seven commercial licensees. 37
 The court found that different standards
relating to service to the hearing impaired were applicable in determining whether to
renew the licenses of noncommercial and commercial broadcast stations. 3" Because public
television stations receive federal financial assistance and are therefore subject to section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act," the court stated, the FCC was obligated, at a minimum, to
inquire into the station's efforts to meet the needs of the hearing impaired in making its
public interest determination." While recognizing that substantial deference must be
given to the Commission's judgment in construing the public interest standard, the
appeals court found that the FCC must consider the national policy of nondiscrimination
against the handicapped minority expressed in the Rehabilitation Act when acting on
renewal applications for public television stations:" The court stated that, in contrast, the
seven commercial stations were not specifically obligated to consider the needs of the
handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act because section 504 applies only to entities
receiving federal funds. 42 Commission renewal of broadcast licenses, the court noted, did
not constitute financial assistance.''' Stating that the Rehabilitation Act reflected a strong
policy favoring increased opportunities for the hearing impaired, the court reasoned that
the Communications Act requirement that broadcast licensees serve the public interest
incorporated the policy goal of the Rehabilitation Act." Thus, the court concluded, under
the Communications Act mandate that licensees serve the public interest, even commer-
cial stations are required to make some accommodations for the hearing impaired." The
court deferred to the Commission's judgment that the commercial licenses be renewed,
however, because of the FCC's special competence in the technological and economical
aspects of captioned programming."
Both the Commission and the public licensee petitioned the Supreme Court lOr
" Id. The Commission also noted that it might be necessary to make rules to insure program-
ming for the hearing impaired in the future should the present policy of encouraging experimenta-
tion with closed captioning prove unsuccessful. M. at 28!.
" Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 301.
38
 Id.
" The HEW, which originally had responsibility for enforcement of the Rehabilitation Act, took
the position that section 504 applied to public broadcasting stations receiving federal financial
assistance. Id. at 303 n.22.
40 Id. at 307.
41
 Id. at 308. The court noted that it is a "settled proposition that a federal agency, in construing
the requirements of 'public interest' under its governing statute, must at least give weight to federal
laws and public policies addressed to similar purposes," even though responsibility for enforcement
is vested in another agency. Id.
4 ' Id. at 312.
43 Id.
44
 Id. at 315.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 315-16.
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review of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorarith in
order to address the implications of the Court of Appeals' holding on the status of licenses
of public broadcasting stations." In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court held that
the FCC did not abuse its discretion in interpreting the public interest standard by
refusing to impose a greater obligation to provide special programming for the hearing
impaired on a public licensee than on a cotntnercial licensee. 49
The Supreme Court's decision in Community Television is significant for two reasons.
First, the Court reaffirmed and extended the FCC's broad discretionary power to inter-
pret the public interest standard in the Communications Act.. 50
 The Court found that the
Commission's authority included the ability to ignore national policy expressed in other
federal statutes." Second, by confirming that the Commission, in considering whether-to
grant a renewal application, may choose to ignore whether or not its licensees are
complying with legislation the FCC is not specifically designated to en force, 52
 the Court
sent a clear message to Congress regarding the drafting of future legislation. When
promulgating laws that could potentially impact on a federal agency's duties under
existing legislation, Congress must clearly state whether it intends the national policy
embodied in the new legislation to be considered by an agency in carrying out a prior
statute."
This casenote will begin by discussing the public interest standard included in the
Communications Act. and the interpretation the FCC and the courts have given the
requirement. This discussion will establish the context in which Community Television of
Southern California v. Gottfried was decided. In the second section, the policies and pur-
poses of the Rehabilitation Act will be applied to the area of broadcasting and the
obligations of the FCC. It will be submitted that an agency has a duty to consider national
policy expressed in legislation other than the agency's own enabling act. The third section
describes the Supreme Court's decision in Community Television. Finally, the article ana-
lyzes the Court's opinion. This analysis demonstrates that the Community Television Court
focused solely on the language of the Rehabilitation Act and ignored the purpose of the
Communications Act, which is to assure the benefits of telecommunications to all the
people of the United States. It will he submitted that the Court's deference to the FCC's
interpretation of the components of the public interest standard was misplaced in view of
the FCC's failure to take positive steps to provide the hearing impaired with access to
television and because of the FCC's movement toward deregulation of the broadcasting
industry. In addition, the discussion will demonstrate that the Court in Community Televi-
sion modified the principle enunciated in previous decisions that an agency, in making
decisions concerning the public interest, should consider the policies expressed in rele-
vant laws other than the statutes the agency is empowered to enforce. It will he suggested
that Congress should review the FCC's duties under the Communications Act and require
the FCC to promulgate standards and regulations insuring access of all persons to the
benefits of telecommunications. Specifically, the FCC should set standards concerning
" 454 U.S. 1141 (1982). Both the FCC and the licensee, public television station KCET-TV,
petitioned for certiorari.
" Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 508 (1983).
49 Id. at 500, 513.
" See infra notes 153-71 and accompanying text.
5 ' See infra notes 154-63 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
" See Mira note 239 and accompanying text.
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captioning technology for the broadcasting industry. In addition, the Commission should
set a minimum on the amount of captioned programming a station must offer.
I. THF. INTERpRETATIoN OE THE PUBLIC INTEREST
STANDARD IN THE COMMUNICATIONS Am-
The Communications Act empowers the FCC to grant applications for new broadcast
licenses and subsequent license renewals if" the Commission determines that renewal
would be in the public interest.' The Supreme Court has held that Congress gave the
Commission broad discretionary power to define the components of the public interest
stanclard.' 5 As the Court has noted, the Act's legislative history reveals Congress' concern
that a balance be established between the broadcaster's need for journalistic indepen-
dence and his statutory obligation to consider the public's interest in securing the benefits
of telecommunications. 56 The Commission must be flexible in finding the best way to
insure that licensees operate in the public interest but still retain control over the selection
of their broadcast rnateria1. 3 T
The broad authority given the FCC to determine the components of" the public
interest criterion, however, was not intended to be so extensive as to confer unlimited
power on the Commission. 5" In 1943, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States," the
Supreme Court established general guidelines fOr determining this standard." The
National Broadcasting Court addressed a challenge to the FCC's authority to issue regula-
tions defining permissible relationships between the networks and their local affiliates."'
The public interest sought to he served under the Communications Act, the Court stated,
was the interest of' the listening public in the larger and more effective use of radio." An
important factor in considering the listening public's interest, the Court noted, was the
ability of a licensee to render the best practicable service to the community it serves." The
National Broadcasting Court upheld the FCC's authority to issue regulations designed to
correct abuses of chain broadcasters after the Commission had found that too much
network control over local programming was not in the public interest. In National
" 47 U.S.0 § 307(a) (1976). In addition, the basic qualifications for licensees can be found in 47
U.S.C. § 308(b). All applications "  shall set forth such facts as the Commission by regulation may
prescribe as to the citizenship, character, and financial, technical, and other qualifications ... .'' Id.
E.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1981).
5" Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 104-10,
125 (1973). The licensee has an obligations as a "public trustee" to provide balanced coverage of issues
and events but has broad discretion to decide how to meet this obligation. Id. at 118. See also, Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966). A
broadcaster is not in the same category as a newspaper in terms of the public obligation imposed by
law. Id. Rather, a broadcaster seeks and receives free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable
resource. Id. When it accepts a license, the broadcaster becomes burdened by enforceable public
obligations. Id.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 122-24
(1973).
" National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
59 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
6" Id. at 216.
" Id. at 209-10.
" Id. at 216.
" Id. (citing Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475
(1940)).
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Broadcasting, therefore, the Court limited the FCC's discretionary authority by requiring
the Commission to consider the listening public's need for adequate broadcast. service in a
particular community when determining whether a licensee will serve in the public's
interest."
The Supreme Court's interpretation of "public interest" in other legislation provides
an additional limitation on the FCC's discretion in defining that term under the Com-
munications Act. Consistently, the Court has held that the words "public interest" should
be construed in accordance with the purposes of the regulatory legislation in which the
words are contained. In the Court's view, the term does not constitute a broad license to
promote the general public welfiire. 65 For example, in NAACP v. FPC 66 the Supreme
Court considered whether the Federal Power Commission ("FPC") has the authority to
prohibit discriminatory employment practices by its regulatees. 67 The NAACP argued
that the FPC was charged with promoting the public interest in general, including
encouraging an end to discrimination in employment, because of references to the public
interest in the Power and Gas Acts. 68 In considering this argument, the Court looked to
the purposes behind the Power and Gas Acts to determine the meaning and content of
the term "public interest."" The Court found that the purpose of the acts was to promote
the production of energy at reasonable rates, and not to eliminate discrimination in
emptoymenL 7° Consequently, the Court held that the FPC could only consider the effects
of discriminatory employment practices by its regulatees in relation to how such practices
affected the establishment of just and reasonable rates."
Similarly, in New York Central Securities Corp. v. United Stales, 72 the Supreme Court held
that the public interest standard in the Transportation Act 77 referred to the purposes and
requirements of that statute and not to the public's general welfare." In the New York
Central case, the Court rejected the argument that Congress' delegation of authority to the
Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") was invalid because the public interest stan-
dard was too vague. 75 Instead, the Court found that the purpose of the Transportation
Act — to provide economical and efficient transportation to the public — furnished
substance to the public interest standard sufficient to guide the ICC in interpreting the
standard."
Despite these judicial guidelines, however, the FCC's discretion in interpreting the
Communications Act's public interest standard remains broad. The Supreme Court has
shown great deference to the experience and expertise of the FCC in considering
challenges to the Commission's interpretation of the public interest standard in licensing
and rulemaking procedures. 77 The Court has stated that it will reverse the decisions of the
64 National Broadcasting, 319 U.S. at 218, 224.
65
 NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976).
66 Id. at 662.
67 Id. at 663.
" Id. at 666. The Gas and Power Acts referred to are the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 1791a
(1982) and Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1982).
60 NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. at 669.
70 Id. at 669-70.
7 ' Id. at 671.
72 287 U.S. 12 (1932).
72 The Transportation Act is found at 49 U.S.C. 	 1 (1976).




77 See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593.94 (1981); FCC v. Nacional
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 803 (1978).
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FCC only if the Commission's position is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.'" Fur-
thermore, the Court has established that, in considering the purposes of a statute which
contains a public interest criterion, the agency's interpretation should be followed unless
there are compelling indications that the agency is wrong," Asa result, the courts have
been especially deferential to the FCC where the Commission's decisions concerning the
public interest are based on judgmental or predictive coiicltisiuiis.TM° The Supreme Court
has found that Congress delegated the task of weighing competing policies to the FCC,
not to the courts."
The discretion granted the FCC by Congress gives the Commission the option to
consider the policies embodied in federal statutes other than the Communications Act
when determining whether stations have fulfilled the public interest standard in licensing
proceedings." In addition, the FCC can incorporate other government policies into its
regulations." The Commission has exercised this option and taken a number of different
statutes into account. For example, although the FCC does not have the power to enforce
antitrnst laws, it may, and has, incorporated antitrust. policies into the Communications
Act's public interest standard through its rulemaking powers." In FCC v. National Cinzerks
Committee for Broadcasting," the Supreme Court supported the FCC's position and held
that the FCC has the authority to promulgate regulations to promote diversification, attic
media." Similarly, because the Commission recognizes that the public interest is not
served by licensees who discriminate in employment, the FCC requires stations to file
information about projects designed to provide equal employment opportunities to
minorities." These regulations reflect. the FCC's decision to formally adopt. national
" See Administrative Procedure Act
	 104, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
1L! Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
"" NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In this case the court of appeals upheld
the FCC's decision to abandon its policy of requiring evidentiary hearings on applications involving
television ownership concentration. Id. at 996. The court noted that when concepts as elusive as
diversity of ownership are involved, the FCC has leeway to balance the competing policy consid-
erations and choose an appropriate course of action so long as it bases its decision on rational
grounds. Id. at 1001-02.
"' FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 810 (1978).
" See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 795.
83 Id.
14 Id.
" Id. at 775.
" Id at 802. During hearings on the multiple ownership rules, the FCC stated, "To be sure, the
fitct that we do not enforce the antitrust laws per se shows that we are not required to apply specific
antitrust criteria in measuring the adequacy of competition in any given case, as if the relationship
between competition and the public interest were apodictic Rut we are hardly barred from
concluding that competition is what the public interest requires . . . ." Nlultiple Ownership, 50
F.C.C.2d 1046, 1117 (1975). The multiple ownership regulations reflect a general policy within the
FCC. For example, the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393. 394-95
(1965), emphasizes the diversification factor in comparative hearings. The diversification regulations
also reinforce the congressional policy embodied in the Communications Act itself, which states that
any licensee found guilty of violation of any antitrust laws shall have its license revoked, subject to
appeal or review. 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1976).
" See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1982). In addition, a model EEO program can he found in Nondis-
crimination in Employment Practice.s (Broadcast), 60 F.C.C.2d 226, 249-52 (1976). Bra see Bilingual
Bicultural Coalition v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In discussing FCC recognition that the
public interest is not served by licensees who engage in intentional employment discrimination, the
court stated: ''This is not to say ... that the FCC in considering license renewals is charged with an
jut)/ 1984]	 CA SE/VOTES	 901
policies on antitrust anti equal employment as components of the public interest standard.
Although, as indicated, the Commission serves as an overseer and guardian of the
public interest through its licensing and rulemaking functions, the listening public also
has an opportunity to express its viewpoint. The most significant opportunity afforded to
the public to voice opinions is provided in license renewal proceedings. 88 Indeed, in Office
of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC," the Court of Appeals for the
District of' Columbia noted that the public may even have a duty to take an active interest
in the scope and quality of broadcast services?" The court in United Church of Christ found
that the listening public had standing to contest the renewal of a broadcast license. 9 ' In the
context of license renewal proceedings, public participation takes the form of petitions to
deny, 92 informal objections," and complaints" to the FCC. 93
The Commission considers such input from the public in determining whether a
formal heating is necessary to evaluate whether or not a licensee is operating in the public
inierest. 98 For several reasons, however, formal hearings on license renewal applications
are infrequent?' Because of the expense and delay involved in scheduling a hearing, the
undifferentiated mandate to enforce the antidiscrimination laws: the FCC is not the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and a license renewal proceeding is not a Tide VII suit. - Id.
at 628. In view of the purposes of its regulatory legislation, the FCC analyzes the employment
practices of its licensees only to the extent those practices affect the licensee's obligation to provide
programming that reflects minority interests and raise questions concerning the character qualifica-
tions of the licensee. N.
" Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973).
" 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
" Id. at 1003. The court noted that although the FCC represents and is the prime arbiter of the
public interest, the Commission has many duties and cannot monitor the performance of every one
of thousands of licensees. Id. The FCC depends on public reaction as a reliable lest of ideas and
performance in broadcasting, Id, Responsible representatives of the listening public therefore have
standing as parties in interest to contest renewal of a broadcast license before the FCC. Id. at 1002.
For an overview of public involvement in the license renewal, see Chamberlin. Le3.50118 in Regulating
Inl'ormation Flow: The FCC-.% Break Track Record in Interpreting the Public Inter"! Standard, 60 N.C.L.
REV., 11057 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Chamberlin). The author states that in regard to public issues
programming. dm FCC has relied on complaints from the public about failure of licensees to fulfill
their public interest responsibilities. rather than [11111:a ing action against a licensee itself. Id. at 1097.
Si
 United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003.
92 Petitions to deity a new or renewal application are formal filings that contain allegations of
fact sufficient to show that the petitioner is a party in interest and that grant of the application would
be prima facie inconsistent with the public interest standard, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3584 (1982). The
allegations must be supported by affidavits, unless official notice is taken of them. Id.
Informal objections may be filed by any person prior to FCC action on an application. 47
C.F.R. § 73.3587 (1982). These objections may be submitted in letter form, hi. Rules on limitations  on
pleadings and time for filing do not apply to an informal objection. M.
94 The Complaints and Compliance Division of the Broadcast Bureau, a principal staff unit of'
the FCC, is responsible for investigating complaints and answering general inquiries front the public
regarding radio and television services. 47 C.F.R. § 0.71 (1982).
a Radio Broadcasting Services: Revision of Applications for Renewal of License of Commercial
and Noncommercial AM, FM, and Television Licenses, 46 Fed.Reg. 26236, 26239 (1981).
"
" See, e.g.. 45 FCC ANN. REP. 35 (1979). In fiscal year 1979, the FCC received 3635 license
renewal applications fOr radio AM and FM stations and television stations. Id. It acted on 2433 of
them. Id. Only six AM radio stations and two television stations were designated for evidentiary
hearings on various issues. Id.
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FCC regards a formal proceeding as, in effect, a sanction. 98 Consequently, the FCC has
conducted hearings only when it found that the challenged licensee could not be encour-
aged to improve its service or iliac there was substantial evidence that the licensee was not
acting in the public's interest." Furthermore, the Commission considers a denial of
renewal to be too harsh a penalty for all but the most serious violations of rules or other
misbehavior.'"" A study of license revocations and denials of renewals from 1968-78
revealed that, out of the approximately three thousand renewal applications considered
each year," the FCC withdrew the licenses of only sixty-four radio and television stations
during that ten-year period.'" The FCC, therefore, seldom denies a license renewal
application.
The FCC's handling of the public interest standard has engendered much criti-
cism.'" Although the Supreme Court has characterized the standard as "a supple instru-
ment" which allows the FCC to carry out the legislative policy of Congress,' critics have
argued that the Commission's failure to interpret the public interest standard through
prospective regulations or statements which clearly convey the scope and intent of FCC
policies leads to uncertainty about what requirements an applicant must meet to fulfill the
statutory standard. 105 For example, questions arise as to what factors the Commission will
give the most weight when determining which applicant will best serve the public interest
in comparative broadcast hearings.'" In its Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast
Hearings,'"' the Commission noted that its membership is not static and that the views of
individual Commissioners may change. 118 Moreover, the Commission stated that it makes
policy changes whenever it deems changes to be appropriate, either by ruling in individ-
ual cases or by issuing general statements. 199 Determinations of what comprises the public
interest therefore may vary as the composition or tenor of the Commission changes.
Consequently, applicants competing for the same license cannot be certain which of the
criteria set forth in the Communications Act, and in a variety of policy statements, rules
" Chamberlin, supra note 90, at 1098 n.248.
" Sre generally id. at 1098; 47	 § 309(e) (1976).
FRAsuittiNi, supra note 5, at 770.
1 °' Id. at 769.
"" Weiss, Station License Revocations and Denials of Renewal 1970-78, 24 J. off B. 69 (1980).
" See e.g., Fowler, The Public's Interest, 56 FLA. B. J., 213 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Fowler]
(Commission should defer as much as possible to broadcaster's judgment about how best to compete
for viewers and listeners in programming because this deferene would best serve public interest);
Scott, Licensing By Choice, Chance, or Chicanery?, 35 AD. L. REV. 37 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Scott]
(characterising public interest standard as vaporous and meaningless in his criticism of merit
selection of licensees).
"" FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593 (1981) (citing FCC v. Pottsville Broadcast-
ing Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940)).
1 " See Chamberlin, .supra note 90, at 1097.
See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). The Commission
conducts comparative hearings when two or more qualified applicants seek the same or interfering
FRANKIAN, supra note 5, at 751. In a comparative proceeding, the applicant must meet more
than the minimum qualifications for a license. Id. The additional criteria by which the Commission
will judge the applicant have evolved through adjudication and not through formal rulemaking
procedures. Id. at 752
1" 1 F.C.C.2d at 393.
'"K Id. at 393, 399.
1" Id, at 399.
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and decisions of the Commission,"' will be emphasized in a particular comparative
proceeding."' For example, although a license applicant's level of minority stock own-
ership and participation had previously been declared a relevant consideration in choos-
ing among competing applicants,'" in a later case involving two equally qualified appli-
cants, the Commission's Review Board concluded that local residence and civic participa-
tion, a criterion usually only marginally important,'" outweighed minority ownership. 114
As a result of such changes, opponents of the selection of licensees on the basis of
probable service in the public interest contend that this type of merit selection becomes an
arbitrary decision."' Furthermore, according to the critics, because of the lack of clear
guidelines concerning, for example, requirements for programs on public issues, the
Commission has been less inclined to schedule a hearing in response to a petition to deny
to determine whether or not a licensee is serving in the public interest.' Despite these
criticisms, the FCC has retained broad authority to determine the components of the
public interest standard.
II. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT AND THE
FCC's RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE STATUTE
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination against oth-
erwise qualified handicapped persons, applies to any program or activity receiving federal
funds and to any activity conducted by any executive agency.'" The Supreme Court
interpreted section 504 in Southeastern Community College v. Davis ," 8 holding that the
purpose of the statute is to prohibit discrimination against a person who meets all the
requirements of a program in spite of a handicap." 9 In Davis, the Court found that the
school had not violated section 504 by denying a deaf applicant admission to the college's
nursing program.'" In so ruling, the Court upheld the school's determination that the
1 " Sharp, Lotteries at the FCC: The Prelude to Experience, 35 An. L. REV. 45, 46 n.9 (1983).
[hereinafter cited as Sharp].
" 1 See Grand Broadcasting Co., 36 F.C.C. 225 (1964) for an example of how the Commissioners
themselves have difficulty weighing factors to decide which applicant will best serve the public
interest. The comparative hearing process is lengthy and expensive. Wunder, New Service Licensing
Alternatives, 35 An. L. REV., 61, 62 {1983). The average hearing takes between nine and thirteen
months and the cost of legal representation alone averages $100,000. Id.
1 " TV9, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n., 495 F.2d 929, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
rehearing and rehearing en bane denied (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 986 (1974). In TV9, the Review
Board accorded no merit for black ownership or participation in a comparative broadcast proceed-
ing, asserting that the Communications Act is color blind. Id. at 935-36. The court of appeals,
reviewing the FCC's licensing decision, rejected this argument. hi. at 936. The court found that
minority stock ownership was a relevant factor in choosing among applicants because it indicated
broader representation of the local community and practicable service to the public in a city in which
the minority group was not otherwise represented in the ownership of mass communications media.
Id. at 937 & n.26
See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 11 F.C.C.2d at 395-96.
"4 FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 768 (citing Waters Broadcasting Corp. 50 R.R. 2d 1110 (1982)).
"' Scott, supra note 103, at 42.
118 Chamberlin, supra note 90, at 1079.
117 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1980).
"8 442 U.S. 397 {1979).
"" Id. at 406.
120 Id. at 414.
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applicant did not qualify for the program because of her hearing disability. 131 Looking
closely at the language of the statute, the Davis Court found that. section 504 requires only
that an "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual not be excluded solely because of his
handicap.' 22
 An otherwise qualified person, the Court stated, is one who is able to meet all
of a program's requirements in spite of his or her handicap. 123 The Court determined that
the deaf applicant was not otherwise qualified because the ability to hear was a legitimate
physical qualification for the nursing program. 124
 According to the Court, the ability to
hear might be necessary to insure patient safety during the clinical part of the program
and was conceivably essential in performing many of the duties of a registered nurse.'
Finally, the Court found that review of the language, history and purpose of section 504
did not reveal any congressional intent to impose an affirmative action obligation on all
recipients of federal funds.'" As a result of the Court's reasoning in Davis, a handicapped
person must prove that he or she meets all the requirements of a program to prevail in a
suit alleging a violation of section 504. 127
 Under this statutory interpretation, public
television stations would not need to make accommodations for the deaf if hearing were
an essential qualification for access to television. Because captioning technology exists,
however, the hearing impaired meet the requirements of the activity, television viewing,
and are therefore persons otherwise qualified to enjoy the benefits of television.
The Department of Justice is responsible for enforcing and coordinating the im-
plementation of section 504. 128 This provision applies to noncommercial broadcast sta-
tions because they receive federal financial assistance. 1 '4 9
 Section 504 also applies to
12 ' Id. at 402, 414.
122 Irl. at 405.
131 Irl. at 406. Legitimate physical qualifications may be essential for participation in a particular
program, the Court 'explained. Id. at 407.
1 " Id. at 407.
P25 Id.
u" Id. at 411. The Court did note, however, that the line between unlawful discrimination and a
lawful refusal to extend affirmative action may not always be clear. Id. at 412. Technological advances
may enable attainment of goals without imposing undue financial burdens. Id.
127 Id. at 402-14.
1 ' Executive Order No. 12,250 transferred enforcement responsibility to the Department of
Justice. 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980). Section 504 was patterned after Title VI and no agency was
originally designated to enforce it. Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 459
U.S. 498, 509 (1983). In 1976, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was designated. See
Exec. Order No. 11,914, 45 C.F.R. Part 85, App. A, at 374. At first, the HEW did not promulgate any
regulations to implement section 504, relying on its plain language. Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404 n.4 (1979). Sec supra note 18 for text of section 504. No
regulations have yet been adopted concerning captioning of television programs.
"P The sources of funding for public broadcasting in 1982 were: Corporation for Public
Broadcasting ("CPB") — 20,5%, state governments — 18.9%, subscribers — 16.7%, state colleges and
universities — 10.7%, business — 10.7%, local governments — 5.1%, other — 7%. "Final Report of
the Temporary Commission on Alternative Financing for Public Telecommunications", fig.1. The
CPB consists of a 15 member Board of Directors, appointed by the President, subject to confirmation
by the Senate. No more than eight members may be from the same political party. Community-
Service Broadcasting of Mid-America v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Stations
receiving funds from CPB roust meet all the licensing requirements of the FCC applicable to
noncommercial stations and must he owned and operated by a public agency or nonprOfit private
foundation, corporation or association. Id. at 1107 n.10. CPB duties are to disburse funds to
production entities arid noncommercial broadcast stations, to arrange for an interconnection system
capable of distributing programs, to conduct research and demonstrations, and to encourage crea-
tion of new noncommercial stations. Id. at 1107.
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activities conducted by executive agencies,' In an effort to meet its responsibilities, the
Department has promulgated rules stating that each agency must "issue a regulation to
implement section 504 with respect to the programs and activities to which it provides
assistance."''' These rules define an agency as any federal department or agency empo-
wered to extend financial assistance. 132 Since the FCC does not provide financial assis-
tance,' 33 it does not fall within this definition.'" The FCC has determined, therefore, that
Department of Justice rules do not apply to the Commission and has not promulgated
regulations to enforce section 504.' 35
Although the FCC is only authorized to enforce provisions of the Communications
Act,' 36 and not those of the Rehabilitation Act, the Commission may have an obligation to
consider the policies inherent in other legislation. In McLean Trucking Co. v. United
Staley,'" although the Court found the ICC had not abused its discretion when it deter-
mined that a consolidation of motor carriers which might have anticompetitive effects was
within the public interest,' 36 the Court stated that agencies should consider policies
embodied in relevant legislation. The Supreme Court in McLean held that in executing
the policies embodied in its enabling legislation, an agency may be faced with overlapping
or inconsistent policies contained in other legislation that it cannot ignore. 136 The Court
stated that although an agency may not be authorized to enforce an act, it is not
authorized to ignore it either,'"
Subsequent to the McLean decision, the Supreme Court in Denver Rio Grande Western
Railroad Co. v. United Stales , 11 again addressed the ICC's responsibility to consider the
policies expressed in legislation other than its enabling act ,142 The Court stated that
Congress' use of the broad term "public interest" in the Interstate Commerce Act re-
vealed an intent that. the ICC not ignore facts indicating that transactions under its
consideration for approval might exceed limitations imposed by other relevant laws.' 43
According to the Court, common sense and sound administrative policy supported this
conclusion.'" Moreover, the Court noted, the Clayton Act' 45 expressly authorized the
ICC to enforce compliance with the antitrust laws where applicable to common carriers.'"
The Court's holding in Denver supported the proposition that agencies empowered under
Lac' 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp V. 1980).
' 3 ' 28 C.F.R. § 41.4(a) (1982).
' 3' 28 C.F.R. § 41.3(c) (1982).
' 33 License Renewal Applications, (Petition for Reconsideration), 72 F.C.C.2d 273, 278 (1979).
' 34 Licenses are not federal financial assistance. See Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297, 313-14 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
135 Id.
136 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
137 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
'a' Id. at 87-88. The Court noted that pursuant to Section 5(11) of the interstate Commerce Act,
carriers participating in an approved consolidation are exempt from the restraints of antitrust laws
insofar as necessary to enable them to effect the approved transaction. Id. at 76.
' 38 Id, at 80.
1" Id. at 86.
141 387 U.S. 485 (1967).
" 2 Id. at 493.
' 43
 Id. at 492.
144 Id.
'" 15 U.S.C. § 21(11) (1982).
146 Deriver, 387 U.S. at 493 n.6.
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a "public interest" standard should consider policies expressed in legislation relevant to
their statutory purpose.
Following the reasoning of' the McLean and Denver decisions, the FCC has concluded
that it has a duty to consider whether federal laws other than the Communications Act
have been violated when evaluating applicants for licenses.'" Indeed, the FCC stated that
it would take appropriate action if another agency found a licensee violated section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act.'" The FCC has determined that such violations reflect on an
applicant's character qualifications and therefore may be indicative of future broadcast.
performance. 149 Violations of federal law, however, are considered only to the extent. that
the violations bear on matters entrusted to the Commission.' 5° Relevant considerations
include whether the violation was broadcast related, whether it was recurrent, and
whether the acts were willful or inadvertent. 151 Although the FCC is only empowered to
enforce the Communications Act, the FCC has therefore recognized the need to consider
the policies embodied in other legislation. The Commission, however, refused to consider
whether licensees seeking renewals had violated the policy prohibiting discrimination
against the handicapped found in section 509 of the Rehabilitation Act,' 52 thus precipitat-
ing the suit in Community Television.
III. COMMUNITY TELEVISION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA V. COTTFRIED
A. The Majority Opinion
In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court in Community Television of Southern
California v. Gottfried' held that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not require the
FCC to review a public television station's renewal application under a different standard
than the standard that applies to a commercial station.' 54
 The Court began its discussion
in Community Television by recognizing that there was no question that the public interest
would be served by making television broadcasting more available to the hearing im-
paired.'• Noting that none of the parties suggested that a licensee may simply refuse to
"7
 Report on Uniform Policy as to Violation by Applicants of Laws of United States, 42
F.C.C.2d 399, 401 (1951). A violation of federal law is considered a pertinent part of the past history
of an applicant. Id. at 400. This consideration relates to the character qualification in section 308 of
the Communications Act. Id. By considering violations of other statutes when evaluating license
applications, the FCC does not encroach upon the administrative and enforcement jurisdictions of
other governmental agencies . Id. at 401. The FCC is concerned with these violations only insofar as
they bear on matters entrusted to the Commission. Id. Thus, the FCC considers such violations on a
case-by-case basis. Id. Even if no suit has been filed, or if one has been filed but not been heard or
finally adjudicated, the Commission may consider and evaluate the questions raised and facts
involved. hi. at 403.
148
 License Renewal Applications, 69 F.C.C.2d 451, 459 (1978).
'" In Re Application of Cross Telecasting, Inc., 92 F.C.C.2d 204, 240 (1982).
I" See supra note 147.
'' Grns.s Telecasting, 92 F.C.C.2d at 240. In Gross, the Commission determined that an unfair
labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act was not a relevant
Eictor because the misconduct was remote in time, an isolated occurrence, and settled prior to
adjudication on the merits. /5. at 240-41.
See License Renewal Applications, 69 F.C.C.2d. at 459.
'" 459 U.S. 498 (1983). Joining in the opinion written by Stevens, J. were Burger, C.J., and
White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, J.J.
'" Id. at 500.
1.55 Id. at 508.
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consider the needs of the hearing impaired, the Court then moved directly into a
discussion of whether the Rehabilitation Act was intended to create any additional
enforcement obligations on the FCC. 15 "
Examining the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act, the Court found no
evidence that Congress intended, by enacting the statute, to impose new enforcement
obligations on the FCC or intended to alter the Commission's standard for reviewing the
programming decisions of public television licensees.'" The Court reasoned that the
general words "public interest" in the Communications Act were not sufficient to imply
such duties. 138 While the FCC, as an agency required to promote the public interest, may
have an administrative duty to consider the needs of the handicapped, such as the hearing
impaired, the Court noted that the Rehabilitation Act does not impose any regulatory
standards on the FCC,'" According to the Court, the FCC is not required to consider
applicants for license renewals under the standard set forth in section 504.'" The
Community Television Court found that under the plain words of the statute, the enforce-
ment of section 504 was delegated to those agencies administering federal Financial
assistance. 16 ' The Court concluded that because the FCC is not a funding agency, the
Commission has no responsibility to enforce section 504. '"1 Absent an express direction in
the Rehabilitation Act, the Court stated that it was unwilling to assume that Congress
expected the FCC to take original jurisdiction over the processing of charges that a
licensee had violated the Act.' 63 The Court cautioned, however, that once a violation was
found by the proper agency or court, the FCC would be obligated to consider whether
such a violation had any relevance in its renewal proceeding.'
Having established that the Rehabilitation Act imposed no additional enforcement
obligations on the FCC,'"' the Court then considered whether public television stations, as
recipients of federal aid, have a duty to comply with the Rehabilitation Act and whether
this duty required the FCC to evaluate a public station's service to the handicapped by a
stricter standard than applied to commercial stations.'" The Court found that the non-
commercial stations' duty to comply with the Act did not obligate the FCC to impose a
more exacting standard than the one used to consider license renewals for commercial
stations." The Court stated that the public interest in having all stations consider the
needs of the hearing impaired is equally strong. 6 8 In addition, the Court emphasized that
it was unfair to criticize any licensee, whether public or commercial, for failing to satisfy
' 5" Id. at 508-09.
' 57 Id. at 509-10. The Court dismissed the contention that McLean Trucking Co. v. United
States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944) required the FCC to measure proposals for license renewals of public
television stations by section 504 standards. Id. at 509 n.14.
us Id.
Id.
' 6° Id. See supra text accompanying notes 117 -27 for a discussion of the standards in section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act..
mi Id. at 509.
1412 id.
' 61 Id. at 510.
'"4 Id.
16' Id. at 509- 10.
1" Id. at 511.
167 Id,
168 1d.
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requirements of which it had no notice.'" According to the Court, such changes in
licensing policies should be made prospectively.'" The Court also stated that implementa-
tion of new industry-wide policies through rulemaking is preferred to the uneven applica-
tion of policies that results when isolated license renewal proceedings are used."'
The Community Television Court then noted that its decision did not foreclose the
imposition of stricter standards on public broadcasting stations by other means. 172 The
Court recognized that a federal agency providing funds to public broadcast stations could
establish conditions on its grants, subjecting the station to more stringent requirements
than does the FCC,'" Alternatively, the Court stated that regulations which imposed
special obligations on public stations could be promulgated under the Rehabilitation
Act."4
 The FCC itself, the Court stated, could establish a policy requiring that certain
types of programming be universally provided.'" Such a policy, the Court also recog-
nized, could require certain stations to take more responsibility for developing the
necessary programming."s The Court stated, however, that because such differential
standards had not been created, the FCC did not abuse its discretion in determining that
the public interest standard in the Communications Act does not require the Commission
to impose a greater obligation on public licensees to provide programming for the
hearing impaired than it does on commercial stations,'" Consequently, the majority
concluded that the Court of Appeals' decision that public licensees were subject to stricter
standards was in error." 8
B. The Dissenting Opinion
justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in Community Television in which Justice
Brennan joined. 79
 The dissent began by stating that in granting the renewal of the public
station's license, the FCC refused to consider whether the station had violated the
Rehabilitation Act.' 86
 According to the dissent, the majority's decision that the FCC did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider this possible violation was unsupported by
both precedent and any sound view of administrative process."' The dissent. cited a line
of Supreme Court decisions suggesting that an agency, in assessing the "public interest",
cannot focus solely on the legislation that defines its dinies.' 82 According to the cited
opinions, although the meaning of the phrase "public interest" is to be derived from the
purposes of the statute that defines an agency's responsibilities, the agency may not ignore
other relevant laws if the administrative process is to serve congressional objectives
169 Id .
171) Id. at n.18,
1 " Id. at 511.
'" Id. at 511-12.






'7' Id. at 513.
188 Id.
'8' Id.
1 '12 Id. at 513-17. The cases cited were Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942);
McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944); Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967).
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adequately.'" The dissent stated that in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,`"' the Court.
fOund that although the ICC had no power to enforce the Sherman Act, it could not
ignore antitrust legislation in deciding whether a transaction would serve the public
interest.'"' The Community Television dissent noted that reasoning similar to the reasoning
in McLean was expressed in Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. United Slates.'"". 1  In
Denver, the Court found that the broad term "public interest" indicates that an agency
cannot close its eyes to the requirements of other relevant legislation when making
determinations under its own enabling statute.' 8 ' The dissent also discussed Southern
Steamship Co. v. NLRB,'" in which the Court, while acknowledging the breadth of the
National Labor Relations Hoard's discretion, concluded that the Hoard could not ignore
pertinent federal laws or other equally important congressional objectives.'" These deci-
sions, the dissent noted, established that an agency may not disregard other federal
statutes when implementing its own regulatory scheme. ISO The dissent maintained that an
agency need not conclusively determine what other statutes require or forbid in order to
take possible violations of such acts into account in making decisions under its own
enabling statute.m Prior Supreme Court opinions requiring administrative agencies to
consider other relevant statutes recognize, the dissent stated, that the objectives of Con-
gress would not be served if agencies could ignore statutes they were not specifically
authorized to enforce."'
1 " Community Television at 513 - 17.
"' 32 i U.S. 67 (1944). In McLean, the Supreme Court found that Congress had delegated to the
ICC the task of enforcing the Interstate Commerce Act and the policies expressed in it. Id. at 79. But
in executing these policies, the Court noted, the agency may be faced with overlapping and perhaps
inconsistent policies in legislation enacted at other times. Id. at 80. According to the Court, although
the agency does 1191 have the duty or authority to execute numerous other laws, it cannot ignore
them. Id. at 79-80. In McLean, the Court held that the ICC had not abused its discretion when it
determined that a proposed consolidation of motor carriers was within the public's interest, despite
the anticompetitive effects of the merger. Id. at 85-88.
'" Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 514.
186 387 U.S. 485 (1967).
'" Comniunity Television, 459 U.S. at 515. The Court in Denver held that the ICC must consider
anticompetitive issues under the public interest standard of the Interstate Commerce Act. Denver,
387 U.S. at 501. In addition, the Court stated that the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21, imposes a positive
duty on the ICC to enforce that Act's provisions. Id. at 502. In Denver, the Court found that the ICC
was required, therefore, to consider the anticompetitive effect of a proposed stock issuance. Id. at
492.
1 " 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
189 Community Television, 459 U.S. at 515-16. The dissent quoted Southern Steamship:" the Board
has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act so
singlemindedly that it may wholly ignore other equally important Congressional objectives.' " South-
ern Steamship, 316 U.S. at 47. The Court in Southern Steamship held that the Board exceeded its
statutory authority under the National Labor Relations Act when it ordered the reinstatement of
striking seamen without considering whether the strike had violated federal statutes proscribing
mutiny. Id. at 46 - 48.
'9° Community Television, 459 U.S. at 513, 516 (1983),
1"' Id. at 516
1 °2
 Id. In support of this proposition, the dissent quoted: "'No agency entrusted with determina-
tions of public convenience and necessity is an island. It fits within a national system of regulatory
control of industry.' " Palisades Citizens Association, loc. v. CAB, 420 F.2d 188, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The dissent also noted that the Court in Southern Steamship stated, " Threquently the entire scope of
Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another.'" 316
U.S. at 47.
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Turning to a consideration of "public interest" under the Communications Act, the
dissent maintained that the purpose of the Act was to make rapid communication
available to all the people of the United States. 093
 The dissent noted that the Supreme
Court in NAACP v. FCC 194 had stated that the FCC has an obligation to insure that.
programming reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups.'" In carrying out this
duty, the dissent argued, the FCC should also have an obligation to consider whether a
licensee has denied meaningful programming to a sizeable minority group such as the
hearing impaired.'" According to the dissent, therefore, the FCC should at least have
considered whether the public television station had violated the Rehabilitation Act." 7
The objectives of Congress, the dissent concluded, would not be served if an administra-
tive agency, such as the FCC in the matter before it, were permitted to disregard any
statute it is not specifically authorized to enforce.' 98
IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD IN THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
In Community Television, the Court held that the FCC does not abuse its discretion in
determining whether a public station served the public interest without considering
whether the station had complied with its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. This
section of the casenote will analyze the Court's reasoning in Community Television. It. will be
divided into three parts. The first part will address the interpretation of the public
interest standard. It will be submitted that the Community Television Court failed to
consider the plain language and intent of the Communications Act and the FCC's failure
to fulfill its duty to include all the people of the United States in its determination of the
public interest. The second part will discuss the need for agencies to consider policies
embodied in legislation that they are not empowered to enforce. It will be demonstrated
that. the Court failed to properly apply the reasoning of McLean to the issue before it.
Finally, it will he suggested that Congress needs to review the provisions of the Communi-
cations Act and mandate that broadcast licensees provide programming accessible to all
segments of the population, including the hearing impaired, in view of the enlarged role
of telecommunications in today's society.
A. The Public in the Public Interest Standard
The Communications Act provides that the FCC may approve an application for a
broadcasting license whenever it finds that approval of the license would serve the public
interest. 199
 The courts have found that Congress gave the Commission broad discretio-
nary authority to determine the components of the public interest criterion in accord with
the purposes (lithe Communications Act and have traditionally shown great deference to
the FCC's interpretation of the public interest standard. 20O This broad discretion permits,
but does not require, the Commission to incorporate into the public interest standard the
policies expressed in federal legislation other than the Communications Act."'
1 " Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 517.
1" 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
195 Id. at 670 n.7.
' 96 Community Television, 459 U.S. at 517-18.
197 Id. at 513, 518.
1" Id. at 516.
'09
	 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976).
200 See supra notes 55-65, 77 -81 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
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In Community Television, the Court demonstrated the extent of this deference with its
willingness to affirm the FCC's discretion to ignore what the Court conceded was an
important federal interest in providing opportunities for the handicapped when deter-
mining whether a licensee acted in the public interest."' The Court supported its position
by emphasizing that under the terms of the Rehabilitation Act, the Commission is not
empowered to enforce section 504 because the FCC is not a funding agency. 203
 By
stressing that the FCC had no obligation to enforce the Rehabilitation Act, the Court
avoided the question whether the FCC was fulfilling its administrative duty under the
Communications Act to consider the needs of all people in the community, including the
hearing impaired. 2"
The majority's deference to the FCC's interpretation of the public interest standard
fails to consider the critical role that television often plays in the lives of the hearing
impaired and the limited nature of the FCC's actions thus far to insure this population
access to the benefits of television." 5
 As the dissent noted, the deaf represent a sizeable
minority group in the United States and the Court has found that the Commission has an
obligation to assure meaningful programming to minorities. 206 An estimated 8.5 to 20
million hearing impaired persons need captioned programming in order to receive news
and entertainment material through television."' For many of these people, television is
the only source through which they can receive current news. 208
 Because of their hearing
impairment, television is the sole electronic communications medium which presently has
the ability to provide the visual component necessary for them to enjoy the benefits of
telecomniunications.
Although the FCC has taken some actions toward providing programming for the
deaf, the Commission has neglected to fulfill its responsibility for insuring that such
programming is actually provided. The FCC has chosen to address this issue by encourag-
ing individual licensees to experiment with ways to serve the hearing impaired rather
than by promulgating rules and regulations mandating the telecast of programs accessible
to the deaf. 209
 In 1970; for example, the FCC issued a notice to all television licensees
describing the special needs of the hearing impaired and suggesting ways television could
serve this population. 21 " Subsequently, in recognition of the vital role television plays for
the hearing impaired, the Commission adopted a rule which requires television licensees
to broadcast emergency information visually. 2 " Despite this recognition, the FCC, and the
Court in Community Television, failed to consider that the hearing impaired would proba-
bly not be watching television when emergency information is broadcast if captioned
programming were seldom accessible to them.
Further evidence of the FCC's inadequate attention to the deaf component of the
American public is found in the Commission's response to the passage of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. The FCC did not take the initiative and establish guidelines for captioning, a
202 459 U.S. at 508-09.
'" Id. at 509-10.
204 Id. at 509 n.14.
105
 See infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
210 Id. at 517.
207 Id. at 508 n.12.
208 Id.
209 License Renewal Applications, 69 F.C.C.2d 451, 454-55 (1978).
210 Id. at 454.
2" Id. at 455.
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technology within the Commission's area of expertise. 212 Instead the FCC decided to wait
for the Department of Education, as the agency responsible for coordinating the im-
plementation of section 504, to develop guidelines concerning the obligations of public
broadcasters to the hearing impaired before attempting to assess compliance with the
statute."' Recently, the Department of Education abandoned its rulemaking efforts
concerning television captioning, preferring to enforce section 504 through adjudication
of complaints and by conditioning grant awards on compliance with the statute. 2 " The
FCC, however, has not yet taken any action in response to the Department of Education's
decision, despite the Commission's prior statement that it would consider rulemaking if
none of the projects on the captioning of television programs succeeded in insuring that
the hearing impaired have access to the benefits of televisicm. 115 As a result of this
reluctance to take positive action for the hearing impaired, the FCC has failed to execute
the purposes of its regulatory statute affecting a substantial part of the public who, the
Commission recognized, could benefit greatly from television programming.
The majority's deference to the FCC's judgment in determining the components of
the public interest standard and in deciding how to insure that its licensees serve all
segments of the population, although based on well-established precedent, is no longer
justified. In addition to the Commission's failure to adequately consider groups such as
the hearing impaired, the Commission's recent actions to further its program to deregu-
late the communications industry result in an undesirable decrease in the public's ability
to voice opinions on what constitutes the public's interest and to participate in the FCC's
supervision of its licensees."" The FCC, for example, recently adopted new license
renewal procedures that make it more difficult for the public to affect the license renewal
process.'" Under the new rules, all commercial radio licensees and ninety-five percent of
television and noncommercial radio licensees will file a simplified renewal application
("SRA"), consisting of five basic questions concerning the identity of the licensee and
whether the station has complied with all of the Commission's filing requirements." 8 The
212 Note, Television and ihe Hearing Impaired, 34 FF:D. Comm. L. J. 93, 155 (1982).
213
 Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297, 303 n.22, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Department of
Education was established on May 4, 1980. Id. at 303 n.22. It assumed responsibility for administra-
tion of programs providing financial assistance for the production of educational television to be
shown on noncommercial stations. Id. The HEW study group designated to prepare guidelines for
compliance with section 504 was also transferred to the department. Id. The Department of Educa-
tion issued a notice of intent to develop regulations on January 19, 1981. Nondiscrimination on the
Basis of Handicap, 46 Fed. Reg. 4954 (1981).
2 ' 4 Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness v. Community Television of Southern California,
719 F.2d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 1983). The court of appeals affirmed the department's discretion not
to promulgate rules.
2 " License Renewal Applications (Petition for Reconsideration), 72 F.C.C.2d 273, 281 (1979).
21 ' See infra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
2'7
	 Broadcast Services, 46 Fed. Reg. 26236 (1981).
215 Id. Question one identifies the licensee and its location. Id. at 26238. Question two asks
whether the licensee has tiled its nondiscrimination in employment and current ownership forms. Id.
Question three asks if the licensee remains in compliance with rules relating to interests of aliens and
foreign governments in broadcast licenses. Id. Question four asks whether the applicant has been
subject to an adverse decree by a court or administrative body since its last renewal application. Id.
Question five asks whether the licensee has placed all required information in its public inspection
file. Id. The SRA, a brief one -page form, is known as "postcard renewal." Chamberlin,supra note 90,
at 1105. Five percent of the stations who file for license renewal will be selected at random to
complete a longer audit form, 46 Fed. Reg. at 26236.
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new procedures also provide that the records of stations who file SRAs will be available
only at local stations, when previously all records could be obtained at the Commission's
headquarters in Washington, D.C."' A number of citizen groups have persuasively
criticized the SRAs. These groups argue that curtailed access to station files at the FCC
headquarters hinders the ability of groups and individuals to monitor station perfor-
mance. 22° Critics also contend that the SRAs do not provide sufficient information from
which the Commission can reach the required statutory finding that a grant of renewal
will serve the public interest."'
In addition to the adoption of the SRAs, the FCC has proposed the elimination of the
statutory basis for the fairness doctrine."' This doctrine, which has its source both in the
Communications Act and in FCC regulations, currently requires that broadcasters pro-
vide equal time for candidates for public office, reasonable coverage of controversial
issues, and a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of points of view which differ
from those of the station."" If Congress enacts the proposal, it will eliminate the FCC's
statutory mandate to impose the equal time requirement on its licensees. 224 The current
chairman of the FCC supports the abolition of the fairness doctrine and other rules
relating to programming decisions in favor of adopting a "marketplace" approach to
broadcast regulation."' Under the proposed marketplace policy, the Commission would
eliminate many of its regulatory requirements and defer completely to a broadcaster's
judgment about how to best compete for viewers and listeners."' Proponents of this
approach reason that competition for an audience is the best way to serve the interests of
the public.'"
The establishment of policies forwarding the marketplace approach, however, fur-
ther erodes the FCC's ability to enforce the purposes of the Communications Act and
does not benefit the public as a whole. Reliance on the dynamics of the marketplace to
assure television service to all segments of the population is unrealistic. Currently, broad-
casters have not shown a willingness to accommodate the needs of the hearing im-
paired."" Commercial stations, interested in maximizing profits, arc unwilling to invest in
the technology necessary to serve the hearing impaired absent FCC adoption of a stan-
dard technology for captioning. 22 ' The FCC, on the other hand, has been reluctant to
Id. at 26239.
220 id.
"' Id. at 26239. The Commission, however, asserts that the SRA is a procedural rather than a
substantive change and that the FCC's adoption of the short form will not decrease its ability to make
the public interest finding. Id. at 26240.
222 48 Fed, Reg. 26472 (1983). The FCC adopted a proposal to repeal section 315 of the
Communications Act. Id. at 26473. Section 315 requires broadcasting stations to provide equal
broadcast time to all legally qualified candidates for public office. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976).
223 48 Fed. Reg. at 26474.
224 Id. at 26473. The fairness doctrine also finds authority in the public interest standard
generally. Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288, 296 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1975), ceri. denied, 425
U.S. 934 (1976).
223
	 supra note 103, at 214-15.
"" Id. at 214.
227
 Id. Supporters of the marketplace approach further propose elimination of comparative
licensing hearings and the selection of licensees by lottery. See Wunder, New Semite Licensing
Aliernailve$, 35 An. I,. REV. 61, 63-64 (1983).
228 Note, Television and the Hearing Impaired, 34 Fen. COMM. L.j. 93, 155-56 (1982).
222 Id. at 121, 155-56.
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promulgate regulations beneficial to the deaf which will cost its licensees money.'- 30
Because only the FCC has the technical knowledge and the industry-wide authority
necessary to establish a standard technology for captioning, the Commission's failure to
act virtually assures no increase in the provision of captioned programming. Reduced
regulation of broadcasters' choice of the type of programming they will offer is therefore
unlikely to result in service to groups such as the hearing impaired.
While deregulation reduces costs to both the industry and the FCC, it does not
address the mandate of the Communications Act that the FCC and broadcasters assure
the benefits of the use of a valuable resource to all people. 23 ' Considering the value of a
broadcasting license, requiring licensees to address the needs of everyone is more than
reasonable. When a station obtains a license to operate a broadcasting station, it acquires a
valuable commodity, and in a real sense, a government subsidy. 232
 The FCC issues licenses
free of charge, even though market value of a single license may reach one hundred
million dollars:233
 By pursuing its policy of deregulation, the FCC abrogates its duty to
determine that in return for the grant of this valuable license, a station is fulfilling its
obligation to serve in the public interest. Instead, the Commission is doling out a lucrative
government benefit without insuring that its recipients are advancing the purposes of the
regulatory scheme.
The Community Television decision lends support to the FCC's current policy of
deregulation by acknowledging the broad discretionary power of the FCC to determine
the "public interest" standard, even to the point of ignoring civil rights legislation for the
handicapped. In Community Television, the Court ignored the reality that the FCC has not
fulfilled its statutory duties toward the hearing impaired under the Communications Act,
and that, in its present disposition toward deregulation, the FCC is unlikely to promulgate
any regulations to assure this population's access to television. As a result of the FCC's
nonaction, the hearing impaired are effectively excluded from the public in the public
interest standard of the Communications Act, an outcome that can hardly have been
Congress' intent when enacting the Communications Act. 234 The courts, therefore, can no
longer justifiably defer to the FCC's decisions because the FCC is proceeding on a course
which is not in the interest of the public at large and which will not allow it to fulfill its
obligations under the Communications Act.
B. An Agency's Duty to Consider Policies Expressed in Relevant Federal Legislation
Prior to the Court's decision in Community Television, the Supreme Court had estab-
lished the principle that an agency executing the policies embodied in a regulatory statute
that defines its responsibilities in terms of "public interest" may not ignore the policies set
forth in other relevant legislation. 235
 This principle was reflected in the Court's recogni-
230
 Id. at 126- 29.
22 ' 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
232 See Scott, supra note 103, at 41-42.
233 Sharp, supra note 110, at 45.
234
 Evidence of Congress' awareness of the importance of telecommunications to the hearing
impaired is found in the Telecommunications for Disabled Act of 1982, which is "designed to
promote access to telephone service by the hearing impaired." Access to Telecommunications
Equipment, 93 F.C.C.2d 1311 (1984). The Act directed the FCC to promulgate rules to implement its
provisions. Id.
233 See supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
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lion that congressional objectives in passing laws would not be effectively advanced if
agencies were permitted to ignore the policies incorporated in statutes that they were not
specifically empowered to enforce.'" Under the principle, agencies were required only to
consider the relationship of the policies underlying the other legislation to their own
administrative decisions, and were not expected to determine what the relevant statute
prohibited or allowed. 237 This accommodation recognized that agencies entrusted by
Congress to determine the public interest as it applies to a particular industry are part of a
national system of regulation and that federal agencies are riot isolated entities."' Even
though under this principle agencies did not have to mount separate enforcement efforts
to promote all national policies, the accommodation principle succeeded in forcing
agencies to consider and promote policies consistent with, and complementary to, their
enabling statutes. In Community Television, the Court altered this established principle
when it held that the FCC need consider the possible relevance of federal legislation other
than the Communications Act only if an applicant has been found guilty of violating the
other statute. 239 In so holding, the Court ignored both precedent and the exigencies of
effective implementation of congressional policy through administrative agencies.
The Community Television Court erred initially by framing the issue of the matter
before it as whether the FCC had to enforce public television's obligations under the
Rehabilitation Act toward the hearing impaired in a license renewal proceeding. 240 As the
dissent persuasively asserted, the real issue before the Court was whether the FCC should
have given at least some consideration to the national policy expressed in the Rehabilita-
tion Act when determining whether its licensees were fulfilling their obligation to operate
in the public interest."' As a result of the majority's framing of the issue, however, the
Court misapplied its prior decision in McLean to the situation presented in Community
Television and emphasized the wrong aspect of the McLean opinion."'
The majority in Community Television stated that in McLean , the Court had determined
that even though an agency authorized to regulate a particular industry using a public
interest standard could not ignore policies expressed in other statutes, the agency in
question did not have the authority to execute other laws. 243 Moreover, according to the
majority, McLean established that when considering the policies contained in other rele-
vant taws, an agency need not evaluate the proposals under consideration using the
standards embodied in that other legislation.'" Based on these observations, the Commu-
nity Television Court concluded that although the FCC had an administrative duty to
consider the needs of the hearing impaired, it was not required to evaluate license
235 Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 516.
237 Id.
23' Palisades Citizens Association, Inc. v. CAB, 420 F.2d 188,191 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
239 Community 7'elevision at 509 - 10.
24° Id. at 509.
241 Id. at 515 n.2.
"2 See id. at 509 n.14.
243 Id.
2" ld. In McLean, the discussion of standards resulted from a provision in the Interstate
Commerce Act that exempted certain consolidations of carriers from the antitrust laws. 321 U.S.
83-85 (1944). One issue in McLean, therefore, was whether the ICC had to measure applications for
this exemption by the standards established under the Sherman Act. Id. at 85. The Court found that
the ICC did not have to apply the policies of antitrust law so strictly as to prevent flexibility in
determining what was best for transportation. Id. at 86.
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renewal applications by the standards enunciated in section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.245 The Court, thus, made only cursory reference to the first principle in the McLean
opinion concerning the duty of agencies to consider legislation pertinent to its administra-
tive decisions and focused on the second issue concerning the standards by which an
agency should weigh the requirements of these other la WS. 2" The majority's emphasis on
the standards question was inappropriate, particularly considering that the FCC de-
fended its position itt Community Television partly on the basis that the agency responsible
for enforcing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act had not promulgated any standards by
which it could evaluate a station's service to the hearing impaired. 247
The dissent, on the other hand, correctly recognized that the applicable principle in
McLean is that an agency, when assessing the "public interest" in relation to its regulatory
scheme, cannot ignore other relevant statutes."' As the dissent noted, the McLean deci-
sion clearly stated that although the 1CC's statutory duty and primary focus was enforce-
ment of the policies contained in the Interstate Commerce Act and other transportation
legislation, the ICC was obligated to consider the antitrust policies included in the
Sherman Act, even though the ICC had no power or duty to enforce antitrust legisla-
tion. 249 Applying these principles to the facts before it, the dissent therefore concluded
that the Commission could not simply ignore the Rehabilitation Act in a licensing pro-
ceeding when the Act is relevant."'
The dissent's application of the McLean decision is more persuasive because it reflects
a more reasonable enunciation of the issue before the Court and constitutes a more
realistic view of the workings of the administrative process. The issue before the Court
was not whether the FCC should use standards enunciated under the Rehabilitation Act
to determine if a public station had fulfilled its obligation to serve the public interest.
Rather, the issue presented in Community Television was whether the FCC should at least
consider the policy expressed in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act that recipients of
federal financial assistance should not discriminate against the handicapped when making
licensing determinations concerning public stations. As the dissent noted, absent this
requirement or accommodating one statutory scheme to another, congressional objectives
are unlikely to be effectively promoted!'t According to the Court's decision in Community
Television, however, agencies such as the FCC need only consider their own regulatory
legislation when making decisions concerning the "public interest," 2 i2
 Asa result of the
Court's restriction of the accommodation principle enunciated in McLean and other
decisions, the broad discretion of agencies to determine the public interest is extended at
the expense of any reasonable view of the administrative process. Consequently, Congress
has an increased burden when enacting legislation to specifically provide that every
agency which could conceivably advance the policies underlying the new statute must
consider these polices when making administrative decisions.
'" Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 509 n.14.
446 Id.
247 See Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d at 304.
248 Community Television at 514.
24i Id. at 516.
2 ° Id. at 518.
25' Id.
2s2




C. The Impact of Community Television and Recommendations for the Future
As a result. of the Community Television Court's decision to continue to give the FCC
great discretion in determining the components of the public interest standard, the
hearing impaired are unlikely to find television more accessible through captioning in the
near future. As demonstrated in a previous discussion, broadcasters are unwilling to
provide captioning without a mandate and clear guidelines from the FCC, and the FCC,
in the present period of deregulation, is not apt to formulate such guidelines absent an
order from Congress or the courts to do S0. 253 In addition to the hearing impaired, other
groups are likely to find themselves in a similar position in the future with respect to
access to the benefits of telecommunications. These groups may have an apparent right to
service under the public interest standard but no effective means to enforce it. Children,
for example, are also a segment of the population who can benefit greatly from television
but who have traditionally been slighted by broadcasters and the FCC in the amount of
programming provided for them. 254 Recently, in WATCH v. FCC,'" the court affirmed
the FCC's decision not to hold a license renewal hearing to determine if applicants who
did not provide weekday programming for children were acting in the public interest. 256
Although the court found that the FCC did not unreasonably interpret its own "Chil-
dren's Policy Statement" as not requiring such programming, the court stated that the
evidence revealed the FCC's failure to vigorously enforce its regulations requiring service
to children. 257
Because the FCC has abrogated its duty to assure that all segments of the population
enjoy the benefits of television and other forms of telecommunications and the courts are
unwilling to retreat from their traditional deference to FCC decisions, Congress should
review the Communications Act and the duties of the FCC. The public interest. standard,
as presently developed, no longer suffices to serve the underlying policies of the Act, to
provide rapid and effective communication to everyone.' Electronic media has gained
increasing importance in the dissemination of in formation. 25H Broadcast satellites, cable
television systems and videotext will produce more changes in the way the public keeps
in formed:26" Allowing the FCC to deregulate and leave control of broadcasting to the
forces of the marketplace is unlikely to produce the type of information dissemination
needed in a democratic society. At the very least, the present policy permits the broadcast-
ing industry to deny access to these technological advances to a large segment of the
population, the hearing impaired. Because of their handicap, the deaf can enjoy the
advances of telecommunications only through television. The absence of captioning
therefore denies the deaf access to the only electronic medium potentially available to
them. Even though regulating an industry such as electronic communications pervasively
253 See supra notes 216-30 and accompanying text.
254
 See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 890.
255
 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2160 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
256 Id. at 2161.
257 Id. at 2165. In support of this statement, the court noted the station's meager records in the
area of children's programming, a statement by the chairman of the FCC that the Children's Policy
Statement was not in accord with his deregulatory stance, the recent decline in children's programm-
ing, and the existence of an FCC proposal for rulemaking which would revise or abandon the FCC
policy on children's programming. Id.
1" 47 U.S.C. 4 151 (1976).
2" Chamberlin, supra note 90, at 1110.
560
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via legislation may he unwise because of rapid changes in technology and because of the
need to avoid government interference in the first amendment rights of broadcasters, the
influence and importance of electronic media in our society should not be ignored.
Congress should amend the Communications Act to assure that the FCC includes all
people in the public of the public interest standard. The amendment to the Communica-
tions Act should require the FCC to assure access to telecommunications for the hearing
impaired by mandating inquiry into a licensee's provision of captioned programming in
hearings to establish service in the public interest.
CONCLUSION
Before the Court's decision in Community Television, the judiciary had accorded great
deference to the FCC to determine the components of the public interest standard in the
Communications Act. The Court had, however, found that agencies should construe the
words "public interest" in accordance with the purposes of the agencies' regulatory
statutes. In addition, the Court had established the principle that agencies should con-
sider the policies underlying other relevant legislation when determining what is the
public's interest.
The Supreme Court. in Community Television retreated from its previous position and
held that the FCC need not incorporate the national policy embodied in the Rehabilita-
tion Act into the public interest standard of the Communications Act. The holding in
Community Television reinforces the trend toward deregulation of broadcasting by affirm-
ing the discretionary power of the FCC to interpret the public interest standard as
narrowly as it chooses. By allowing agencies to consider only the policies in their enabling
acts, the Community Television Court has reaffirmed the broad powers of agencies and
altered the previous principle of accommodation of policies expressed in other statutes.
The Court has therefore sent Congress a message to be precise in allocating respon-
sibilities if Congress intends particular agencies to enforce national policies that transcend
their specific statutory mandates.
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